US

Commitment to Policy Rules

Question A:

When economic policy-makers are unable to commit credibly in advance to a specific decision rule, they will often follow a poor policy trajectory.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question B:

Rules-based fiscal policies deliver substantially better outcomes than purely discretionary, on the spot, policy choices.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Question A Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Provided that policymakers do not commit to excessively rigid rules that remain unchanged when previously-unforeseen contingencies arise.
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Baicker
Katherine Baicker
University of Chicago Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Chetty
Raj Chetty
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Every parent knows this.
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Finkelstein
Amy Finkelstein
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Goolsbee
Austan Goolsbee
Chicago
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Read Kydland and Prescott, and Barro and Gordon! Also Stan Fischer on fiscal commitment issues.
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
I think that an independent central bank committee can do a good job even without commitment. So maybe replace "often" with "sometimes".
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Depends on the policy at issue
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
How would we know?
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
It's the "often" that is uncertain. Lack of policy commitment *can* matter but I don't know that it matters often.

Question B Participant Responses

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Acemoglu
Daron Acemoglu
MIT
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
This would depend on how rule-based policies are conceptualized/specified and how (and whether) they respond to emergencies and previously-unforeseen events.
Altonji
Joseph Altonji
Yale
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Auerbach
Alan Auerbach
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Autor
David Autor
MIT
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Baicker
Katherine Baicker
University of Chicago Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Banerjee
Abhijit Banerjee
MIT
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Bertrand
Marianne Bertrand
Chicago
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Brunnermeier
Markus Brunnermeier
Princeton
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Chetty
Raj Chetty
Harvard Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Chevalier
Judith Chevalier
Yale
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Cutler
David Cutler
Harvard
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Deaton
Angus Deaton
Princeton
Strongly Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Duffie
Darrell Duffie
Stanford
Agree
3
Bio/Vote History
Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Berkeley
Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Clearly superiority depends upon the rule. But there is little question that there are fiscal rules that are better defaults than the current default. The current default is that without action (to at least raise debt ceiling), much spending stops and all heck breaks loose.
Eichengreen
Barry Eichengreen
Berkeley
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Einav
Liran Einav
Stanford
Agree
1
Bio/Vote History
Fair
Ray Fair
Yale
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Finkelstein
Amy Finkelstein
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Goldberg
Pinelopi Goldberg
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
In general this is true, but there are situations that call for discretion.
Goolsbee
Austan Goolsbee
Chicago
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Rules without discretion can turn crises into disasters.
Greenstone
Michael Greenstone
University of Chicago
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Hall
Robert Hall
Stanford
Strongly Agree
9
Bio/Vote History
Hart
Oliver Hart
Harvard
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Same reason as before.
Holmström
Bengt Holmström
MIT
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Some commitments clearly valuable
Hoxby
Caroline Hoxby
Stanford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Hoynes
Hilary Hoynes
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Judd
Kenneth Judd
Stanford
Disagree
6
Bio/Vote History
Rules to keep Social Security solvent would be good, but politics get in the way. Most rules are too simple to handle rare events. In 1942 the US needed a new tax system. What rule could have handled the 2008 financial crisis? COVID?
Kaplan
Steven Kaplan
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Kashyap
Anil Kashyap
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
depends on the rule...
Klenow
Pete Klenow
Stanford
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Levin
Jonathan Levin
Stanford
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Maskin
Eric Maskin
Harvard
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Nordhaus
William Nordhaus
Yale
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Obstfeld
Maurice Obstfeld
Berkeley
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Saez
Emmanuel Saez
Berkeley
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Samuelson
Larry Samuelson
Yale
Uncertain
1
Bio/Vote History
Rules have the advantage of avoiding time inconsistency, while discretionary policy can adapt to unanticipated circumstances. The ideal is presumably some mix, which I suspect is closer to rule based than our current policy making.
Scheinkman
José Scheinkman
Columbia University
Agree
7
Bio/Vote History
However, since it is impossible to foresee all possible contingencies, discretion is sometimes needed.
Schmalensee
Richard Schmalensee
MIT Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Shapiro
Carl Shapiro
Berkeley
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Shimer
Robert Shimer
University of Chicago
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Stock
James Stock
Harvard
Agree
5
Bio/Vote History
Thaler
Richard Thaler
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
I have half-jokingly suggested that we assign monetary policies in crises at random to central banks. So for no central banker has found this idea either attractive or funny, but lacking that I repeat: how would we know?
Udry
Christopher Udry
Northwestern
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
Related to above. I'm not sure that ability to commit outweighs flexibility in response to surprises, particularly unforseen events.