Question A:
The use of non-compete clauses in US employment contracts reduces workers' mobility and wages by more than is justified by the protection of employers' intellectual property and trade secrets.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
Occupational licensing reduces mobility and wages for workers in many sectors where they could safely deliver services that consumers would prefer to those offered by licensed workers.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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 Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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No definitive evidence on this. Seems plausible that non-competes are bad for workers and mobility. Caveat: one good paper finds 0 effects.
-see background information here |
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 Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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IP is an important issue and there are settings where some form of noncompete agreement makes sense. But there are problematic settings.
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 David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Some noncompetes are clearly warranted, many not.
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 Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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An extremely fact-intensive question.
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 Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Noncompetes make sense if firms train workers or if workers acquire confidential information. But they seem to be used much more broadly.
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 Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Short-term (6-12 months) non-compete clauses may be reasonable in some situations. But labor mobility is more important now than before.
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 Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Particularly for low skill workers. We know less about higher skill workers.
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 Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
 Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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For example, fast-food restaurants have imposed non-compete clauses, where one suspects there is little to protect.
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 José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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There is however good evidence that it restricts workers' mobility and protects older firms against entrants.
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 Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It does not seem that non-compete clauses designed to reduce mobility are enforceable, but they may still scare workers
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 James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
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Daron Acemoglu |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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"Many" is difficult to judge. The evidence is far from compelling. In some occs, licensing is here rent-seeking. In others, it may be useful
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Joseph Altonji |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Alan Auerbach |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Autor |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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See forthcoming ReStud paper by Morris Kleiner and MIT PhD student Evan Soltas, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3140912
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Katherine Baicker |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Abhijit Banerjee |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Marianne Bertrand |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Markus Brunnermeier |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Raj Chetty |
Harvard | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Judith Chevalier |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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David Cutler |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This obviously varies by sector, but many such licensing requirements are unnecessary.
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Angus Deaton |
Princeton | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Darrell Duffie |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Aaron Edlin |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Protected workers wages often enjoy higher wages, while excluded workers suffer. See "Cartels by Another Name "
-see background information here |
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Barry Eichengreen |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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In this case, "many" is to strong for me.
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Liran Einav |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ray Fair |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Amy Finkelstein |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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occupational licensing is an entry barrier; it should increase wages. And the evidence suggests it does: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
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Pinelopi Goldberg |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Austan Goolsbee |
Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Michael Greenstone |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Robert Hall |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Legislatures seem to cave into special interests but this quest ion is also fact intensive.
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Oliver Hart |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Bengt Holmström |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Skills matter in today's world. Certificates/licenses less. But in some occupations of course essential for safety reasons.
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Caroline Hoxby |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Peter Q Blair (Harvard) gave great advice on this topic! I do not have enough characters to summarize his expert thoughts but consult him.
-see background information here -see background information here -see background information here |
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Hilary Hoynes |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The issue is less about the consumer side and more about the worker side.
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Kenneth Judd |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Steven Kaplan |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Anil Kashyap |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lots of rent seeking behind these rules
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Pete Klenow |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jonathan Levin |
Stanford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eric Maskin |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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William Nordhaus |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Maurice Obstfeld |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Emmanuel Saez |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Larry Samuelson |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Licenses are sometimes essential (e.g., surgeons), but are too often used to limit entry and generate rents for incumbents.
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José Scheinkman |
Columbia University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Kleiner and Kruger provide evidence that licensing increases wages while certification has much smaller effect.
-see background information here |
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Richard Schmalensee |
MIT | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Some licensing requirements are important for safety (e.g. physicians). The problem is unnecessary or over-strict requirements.
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Carl Shapiro |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Strict occupational licensing tends to benefit workers with licenses but serves as an obstacle to those who are not (yet) licensed.
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Robert Shimer |
University of Chicago | Bio/Vote History | ||
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James Stock |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Richard Thaler |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Christopher Udry |
Northwestern | Bio/Vote History | ||
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