Question A:
The response to recent bank failures should be to: Expand central banks’ lender of last resort facilities for banks.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question B:
The response to recent bank failures should be to: Substantially increase the limit on bank deposit insurance.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question C:
The response to recent bank failures should be to: Substantially increase bank capital requirements.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question D:
The response to recent bank failures should be to: Use market values of all traded assets to compute banks’ regulatory capital.
Responses
Responses weighted by each expert's confidence
Question A Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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In some cases this may help but in others it may not. It's not clear central banks have done a very good job in recent years.
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 Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I just do not understand the statement. The LOL role is already available for banks. Is the proposal to make it more generous, to extend it to other institutions?
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 Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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But it should not be the only response!
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 Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Luis Garicano |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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LOLR should be really a last resort. We need to ensure that banks have enough capital to avoid these failures. The Basle rules are a good start- pity that the implementation is riddled with holes.
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 Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Sergei Guriev |
Sciences Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Availability of LOLR facilities is, in practice, already ample. Extensive loans were provided in both the the US and Switzerland. Still, failing banks should be resolved.
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 Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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For moral hazard reasons I find a clear distinction between safe and risky (i.e. liable in the crisis) liabilities more important. A reform of the rules governing deposit insurance can do the trick, I maintain.
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 Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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LOLR should deal with short-term liquidity only.
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 Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Optimal response to recent bank failures is stronger enforcement of risk limitations. In the US, the culprit was failed/insufficient bank supervision. The primary response should be to tighten the conduct of bank supervision
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 Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I am not sure on this one.
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 John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Any expansion should come with quid pro quo in terms of capital and/or propositioned haircut collateral
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 Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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 Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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 Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question B Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It doesn't seem likely that increasing deposit insurance is helpful. Firms and individuals can buy government securities or mutual funds that buy them if they are concerned about default risk.
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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I don't think the moral hazard issue is partlcularly serious in this context.
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Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Together with a stronger monitoring and regulation of banks' risk taking activity
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luis Garicano |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sergei Guriev |
Sciences Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It's not a question of simply increasing the ceiling. What is needed is a politically sustainable definition of what categories of deposit (e,g, those used for working capital of SMEs) are protected. Without that, ex post bailouts are inevitable.
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Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Yes, that is exactly our program
-see background information here |
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Higher deposit insurance not needed for ordinary retail customers. Corporate deposits for payrolls etc can be much higher and should go to money market funds.
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Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Once the Fed bailed out SVB, the market expects unlimited deposit insurance. This forces the and of the Fed to deliver in the event of a future crisis. Accordingly, bank depositors should pay for the implicit insurance
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Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This makes sense to avoid bank runs (even despite some moral hazard effects).
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John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Again this would need accompanying increase in capital requirements
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question C Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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It is not clear we measure bank capital in a good way. Perhaps more importantly, we don't have good theories of bank capital that are widely agreed.
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luis Garicano |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sergei Guriev |
Sciences Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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And regulatory capital should not neglect capital losses on traded government securities resulting from to general interest rate increases.
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Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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To prevent a bank-run, we need a reliable deposit insurance. To prevent moral hazard of an increased deposit insurance, we need lots of bail-in able debt, as well as equity. But equity is not the panacea...
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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For recent runs, liquidity & unstable, short-term funding structures were a bigger issue than level of capital. However, bank capital was shielded from losses for certain securities. Undoing these prudential filters amounts to increasing capital requirements, which is why I agree
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Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Current requirements much too low to provide proper cushion against shocks and to give time for remedial measures if bank is on an unsustainable path.
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Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Miller-Modigliani applies in the long run: there is no trade-off between bank equity and GDP in the long run (but steep trade-off exists in short run). Accordingly, the capital requirements should be increased gradually and steadily (over 10-year period) to new high level
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Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Despite efforts, banks still seem rather under-capitalised.
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John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The case was strong independently of the recent failures
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Question D Participant Responses
| Participant | University | Vote | Confidence | Bio/Vote History |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Franklin Allen |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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This would be an improvement over current rules probably. However, it doesn't deal with the problem of untraded assets.
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Pol Antras |
Harvard | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Olivier Blanchard |
Peterson Institute | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Nicholas Bloom |
Stanford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard William Blundell |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Maristella Botticini |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Agnès Bénassy-Quéré |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Elena Carletti |
Bocconi | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jean-Pierre Danthine |
Paris School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Paul De Grauwe |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jan Eeckhout |
UPF Barcelona | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Ernst Fehr |
Universität Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Xavier Freixas |
Barcelona GSE | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln |
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Jordi Galí |
Barcelona GSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luis Garicano |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Yuriy Gorodnichenko |
Berkeley | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rachel Griffith |
University of Manchester | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Veronica Guerrieri |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Luigi Guiso |
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Sergei Guriev |
Sciences Po | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Patrick Honohan |
Trinity College Dublin | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Am inclined to restrict this to cover valuation changes related to movements in risk-free yields e.g. on traded government bonds. Including other market movements may generate too much procyclicality.
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Beata Javorcik |
University of Oxford | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Jan Pieter Krahnen |
Goethe University Frankfurt | Bio/Vote History | ||
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The accounting should depend on the business model, i.e. whether securities are held to maturity or not. What is needed, however, is transparency - so the market can account for expected losses, and banks can respond with change of their equity.
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Botond Kőszegi |
Central European University | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Eliana La Ferrara |
Harvard Kennedy | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christian Leuz |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Q is too broad. Uncertain for all trad assets. Agree prudential filters for AFS securities should be removed, so that fair value losses affect capital in timely fashion. Banks w/ short-term funding should not use historical cost for HTM securities. Ability to hold matters.
-see background information here |
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Thierry Mayer |
Sciences-Po | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Costas Meghir |
Yale | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Marco Pagano |
Università di Napoli Federico II | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Lubos Pastor |
Chicago Booth | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Torsten Persson |
Stockholm University | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Christopher Pissarides |
London School of Economics and Political Science | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Richard Portes |
London Business School | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Not marking to market gives a misleading picture of solvency. See Admati-Hellwig-Portes VoxEU columns on SVB and CS.
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Canice Prendergast |
Chicago Booth | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Carol Propper |
Imperial College London | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Imran Rasul |
University College London | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Lucrezia Reichlin |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Ricardo Reis |
London School of Economics | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rafael Repullo |
CEMFI | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Hélène Rey |
London Business School | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Antoinette Schoar |
MIT | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Kjetil Storesletten |
University of Minnesota | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Daniel Sturm |
London School of Economics | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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John Van Reenen |
LSE | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Rick Van der Ploeg |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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John Vickers |
Oxford | Bio/Vote History | ||
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My agreement is qualified. Taken literally there are clear dangers of pro-cyclicality. But market values are underused and should at least be used in parallel to traditional methods, e.g. in stress tests.
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Hans-Joachim Voth |
University of Zurich | Bio/Vote History | ||
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Karl Whelan |
University College Dublin | Did Not Answer | Bio/Vote History | |
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Charles Wyplosz |
The Graduate Institute Geneva | Bio/Vote History | ||
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