Ranked-Choice Voting

Rather than using second-round runoffs to settle elections in which no candidate wins a first-round majority, the overall preferences of the electorate would be better reflected by using a single round with ranked-choice voting, in which voters are instructed to rank all of the candidates.

Responses weighted by each expert's confidence

Participant University Vote Confidence Bio/Vote History
Allen
Franklin Allen
Imperial College London
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
There are complicated trade-offs here. Multi-rounds take more time and so attention but allow attention to focus on the finalists.
Antras
Pol Antras
Harvard
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Blanchard
Olivier Blanchard
Peterson Institute
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
it sounds right to this non expert, but one should never forget the Arrow impossibility theorem
Bloom
Nicholas Bloom
Stanford
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Blundell
Richard William Blundell
University College London
Agree
6
Bio/Vote History
Carletti
Elena Carletti
Bocconi Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Danthine
Jean-Pierre Danthine
Paris School of Economics Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
De Grauwe
Paul De Grauwe
LSE
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
This is not my expertise. I am not a political scientist
Eeckhout
Jan Eeckhout
UPF Barcelona
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Fehr
Ernst Fehr
Universität Zurich
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Freixas
Xavier Freixas
Barcelona GSE
Strongly Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
More easy to manipulate. Coordination may lead to the worst choices
Fuchs-Schündeln
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Galí
Jordi Galí
Barcelona GSE Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Giavazzi
Francesco Giavazzi
Bocconi Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Griffith
Rachel Griffith
University of Manchester
Agree
2
Bio/Vote History
Guerrieri
Veronica Guerrieri
Chicago Booth
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Guiso
Luigi Guiso
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
Uncertain
3
Bio/Vote History
Guriev
Sergei Guriev
Sciences Po
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Honohan
Patrick Honohan
Trinity College Dublin
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Uses more information for final choice. Better especially when more than two candidates attract sizeable first preferences.
Javorcik
Beata Javorcik
University of Oxford Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Goethe University Frankfurt
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
The ranking procedure may give undue weight to the group of similar-positioned candidates (doubles).
Kőszegi
Botond Kőszegi
Central European University
Disagree
3
Bio/Vote History
La Ferrara
Eliana La Ferrara
Harvard Kennedy Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Leuz
Christian Leuz
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Mayer
Thierry Mayer
Sciences-Po Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Meghir
Costas Meghir
Yale Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Pagano
Marco Pagano
Università di Napoli Federico II
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Pastor
Lubos Pastor
Chicago Booth
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Persson
Torsten Persson
Stockholm University
Disagree
7
Bio/Vote History
Pissarides
Christopher Pissarides
London School of Economics and Political Science Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Portes
Richard Portes
London Business School
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
With ranking, question is how you aggregate. I prefer single transferable vote: lowest in first count is eliminated, new count, etc.
Prendergast
Canice Prendergast
Chicago Booth
Uncertain
8
Bio/Vote History
Propper
Carol Propper
Imperial College London
No Opinion
Bio/Vote History
Rasul
Imran Rasul
University College London Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Reichlin
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Reis
Ricardo Reis
London School of Economics Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Repullo
Rafael Repullo
CEMFI
Disagree
4
Bio/Vote History
No voting system is perfect, but requiring voters to rank all of the candidates is too complicated.
Rey
Hélène Rey
London Business School Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Schoar
Antoinette Schoar
MIT
Uncertain
5
Bio/Vote History
as initial expression of preferences, ranked system likely more informative. for final formation of gov other institutions play a role too
Storesletten
Kjetil Storesletten
University of Minnesota
Strongly Agree
8
Bio/Vote History
Ranked-choice voting is optimal but takes time to get used to. Better start ASAP
Sturm
Daniel Sturm
London School of Economics
Disagree
5
Bio/Vote History
Simplicity is key for democratic voting systems and I doubt most voters understand how ranked-choice voting really works.
Van Reenen
John Van Reenen
LSE
Disagree
8
Bio/Vote History
Vickers
John Vickers
Oxford
Uncertain
4
Bio/Vote History
Voth
Hans-Joachim Voth
University of Zurich
Uncertain
6
Bio/Vote History
Whelan
Karl Whelan
University College Dublin Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History
Wyplosz
Charles Wyplosz
The Graduate Institute Geneva
Agree
4
Bio/Vote History
Zilibotti
Fabrizio Zilibotti
Yale University Did Not Answer Bio/Vote History