Keyword: European Commission

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Europe

Responses To Market Power

This European survey examines (a) Constraints on the anti-competitive behavior of dominant firms in the digital economy can in principle be effectively implemented using the existing tools of competition policy and antitrust enforcement; (b) The effectiveness of existing antitrust regimes in constraining anti-competitive behavior is substantially limited by the inadequacy of the resources available to competition and regulatory agencies relative to the dominant firms of the digital economy;  (c) Constraints on the anti-competitive behavior of dominant firms in the digital economy would be more effectively implemented than at present with ex-ante regulation such as Europe's Digital Markets Act and other forms of public utility regulation. Details on Digital Markets Act here: https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/index_en
US

Responses To Market Power

This US survey examines (a) Constraints on the anti-competitive behavior of dominant firms in the digital economy can in principle be effectively implemented using the existing tools of competition policy and antitrust enforcement; (b) The effectiveness of existing antitrust regimes in constraining anti-competitive behavior is substantially limited by the inadequacy of the resources available to competition and regulatory agencies relative to the dominant firms of the digital economy;  (c) Constraints on the anti-competitive behavior of dominant firms in the digital economy would be more effectively implemented than at present with ex-ante regulation such as Europe's Digital Markets Act and other forms of public utility regulation. Details on Digital Markets Act here: https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/index_en
Europe

Debt Sustainability

This European survey examines (a) Debt sustainability analysis – for example, as practiced currently by the International Monetary Fund – substantially improves the ability to predict future sovereign debt crises; (b) The European Commission’s proposed move from the existing EU fiscal rules to ones based on debt sustainability analysis would be a measurable improvement; (c) A move from the existing fiscal rules to independent fiscal councils would be more effective than a move to rules based on debt sustainability.
US

Debt Sustainability

This US survey examines (a) Debt sustainability analysis – for example, as practiced currently by the International Monetary Fund – substantially improves the ability to predict future sovereign debt crises; (b) The European Commission’s proposed move from the existing EU fiscal rules to ones based on debt sustainability analysis would be a measurable improvement; (c) A move from the existing fiscal rules to independent fiscal councils would be more effective than a move to rules based on debt sustainability.